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1 Introduction: Information, competitiveness and connectedness  
The possession and control of information offers (at various levels) considerable strategic 
advantages.  This ranges from information that is necessary for survival, and which 
facilitates the attainment of basic needs and freedoms;1 to more complex combinations of 
information that can become independent sources of productivity and power (van Dijk 
2005).   
 
Information has also been described as a source of competitiveness2 - with respect to the 
business world the availability of information is said to change the structure of industries 
and thereby alter the rules of competition.  Information bestows, on those that have access 
to it, new ways of outperforming their rivals; and it can also create new business 
opportunities, even within existing business operations (Porter and Millar 1985).  Could the 
‘competitive advantages’ that emanate from having access and the capacity to use 
information be applicable to non-business entities of varying geographic scope - and 
especially to nation states?   
 
Popular opinion, amongst policy and decision-makers, asserts that affordable and accessible 
information can help nations to improve their global standing by lowering the cost of 
economic and social activities.  It can also enhance their ability to differentiate themselves 
in the global marketplace by increasing the scope and range of activities. As a result, many 
developing countries have invested extensively in infrastructure and advanced 
technologies.3  If indeed nations are like “…big corporation(s) competing in the global 
marketplace” (Clinton cited in Krugman 1994:29), it comes as no surprise that in an 
information-driven world the extent to which a country is ‘networked’ or ‘connected’ to 
the rest of the world is defined as critical to its development. 
 
Using comparative levels of communication infrastructure as indicators of levels of 
“connectedness” (see Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2), the scale of the infrastructural gap in 
sub-Saharan Africa and implications for the competitiveness of this region of the world are 
easily identified. 
 
Table 1: Distribution of international bandwidth across regions 
 
AFRICA ASIA LAC
International Bandwidth % of World Bits per 
inhabitant
Less than other 
regions
Less than other 
regions
Less than other 
regions
(Mbps) [approx] [approx] [approx]
2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
World 4,704,468.8                  759.0        
Africa 5,329.4                        0.11% 6.4           0.05 0.04
Asia 474,207.3                    10.08% 128.3        20.0 0.9
Latin America 
and Caribbean
                      80,377.0 1.71%         146.3 22.9 1.1
Oceania 26,789.6                      0.57% 842.0        131.6 6.6 5.8
Europe 2,929,246.0                  62.27% 3,643.0     569.2 28.4 24.9
North America                   1,188,519.5 25.26%      3,647.9 570.0 28.4 24.9
Bits per inhabitant = International Bandwidth/Population
Source: ITU (2006) World Telecommunications Indicators Database  
 
Table 1 compares the amount of bandwidth (measured in megabits per second – Mb/s) that 
is available to people living in different regions of the world.  It shows that (in 2004) 
approximately 88% of the total bandwidth available worldwide was located in developed 
regions of the world.  More specific to sub-Saharan Africa, using the indicator ‘bits per 
inhabitants’, Table 1 also shows that a person living in Europe or North America had access 
to approximately 570 more bits of bandwidth than someone living in Africa.  Poor 
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bandwidth availability is again illustrated in Figure 1 – a map which summarises the amount 
of international bandwidth available per country adjusted by population.  The map shows 
that the populations of most African countries have access to the least amount of 
bandwidth worldwide; they are the least ‘connected’ globally. 
 
Figure 1: International bandwidth per capita, 2005 
 
 
Source: TeleGeography Research 
 
Low bandwidth is associated with poor telecoms infrastructure.  In this sense the poor 
bandwidth available in sub-Saharan Africa can be partially explained by how under-serviced 
the region is in terms of international submarine cable infrastructure.  The grey lines in 
Figure 2, depicting cable capacity, clearly illustrate the global disparities.   
 
Figure 2: Undersea cable capacity 
 
 
 
Source: TeleGeography Research [telegeography.com/maps] 
 
The dearth of international cable infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa is further 
compounded by expensive international satellite coverage and inadequate terrestrial 
networks between countries in the region, to the extent that communication between 
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African countries is often transited via Europe and/or North America.  The result is a 
situation of prohibitively expensive connectedness. 
 
Strategies for increasing connectivity between countries in sub-Saharan Africa and between 
the sub-continent and the rest of the world must include the deployment of new 
communications infrastructure and, as importantly, the maximisation of existing 
infrastructure.   
 
The focus on maximisation is the result of criticism of how existing infrastructure is being 
utilised.  In particular, questions are being asked about the way infrastructure is 
traditionally built, owned and operated.  In sub-Saharan Africa the criticism can be levied 
at one project: the single grey line in Figure 2, shown originating in Europe (Portugal), and 
running along the west coast of Africa down to southern Africa and across – via Mauritius 
(and Reunion) – to the Far East. It represents a pair of optical fibre submarine 
communication cables known as South Atlantic 3/West Africa Submarine Cable/South Africa 
Far East (SAT-3/WASC/SAFE).   
 
This briefing focuses solely on the ‘Africa section’ of the submarine cable - South Atlantic 
3/West Africa Submarine Cable (SAT-3/WASC).  It provides an introduction to the cable, 
including background information on its development and operation.  It also outlines some 
of the key issues regarding the utilisation of SAT-3 that have been documented in various 
publications and the mass media.   
 
These issues are then discussed using data from a recently concluded research project by 
the Association for Progressive Communications (APC) that looked at the impact of the 
cable in four countries: Angola, Cameroon, Ghana, and Senegal.  The research, initiated in 
November 2006, documented and analysed the way SAT-3/WASC has impacted on the 
telecom markets of these countries, and offers lessons that can be learnt from the 
implementation and management of SAT-3/WASC.  The briefing concludes with 
recommendations (based on the findings of the research project) for maximising the impact 
of SAT-3/WASC on Africa’s connectivity and global competitiveness.  
 
2 Global submarine cable systems: ownership structures 
According to a Telegeography report, when it comes to the transmission of international 
voice and data between continents “rich countries use fibre, poor countries use satellites” 
(2001:98).  Satellites, although providing much needed connectivity, should however not be 
defined as substitutes to fibre.  Submarine telecommunication cables continue to outpace 
satellite performance in terms of both total potential capacity and capacity per unit cost; 
in other words, these cables are less expensive and offer more bandwidth. Voice 
transmissions via satellite also suffer from noticeable delays and in this respect fibre offers 
a better quality of voice service.4 
 
Technological innovations play a key role in global trends in telecommunication services – 
including the rapid growth of the Internet.  These innovations5 have enabled significant 
increases in the capacity and reliability of transmission of networks: 
 
…[M]ore than 100 million simultaneous phone calls can now be handled 
by a single optical fibre submarine cable6 spanning thousands of 
kilometres between continents – a tremendous jump from the first 
transatlantic telegraph cable which transmitted one single word per 
minute in 1858. (Fong 2004:806) 
 
Commercialisation has been (and in most cases continues to be) the primary driver behind 
the expansion of communication networks, and this is reflected in the organisational 
structures that have evolved in the construction and management of submarine cable 
systems.  This trend can be compared to the ‘early days’ when submarine telegraph cables 
were managed by single entities within the countries that owned and operated the cables, 
and which received most of the traffic revenue.  Telegraph cables were, however, usually 
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confined to national borders.  An increase in the demand for international cables – 
connecting at least two national territories - led to the demise of single-entity ownership 
structures and the emergence of ‘committees’ that were able to accommodate wider 
representation of key parties.  These ‘cable management committees’ acquired agreement 
between the participating communications entities, in particular regarding how 
construction and maintenance costs would be shared and how traffic revenues would be 
collected and shared. 
 
Because commercialisation is a key determinant behind network expansion, early 
international cables often concentrated on connecting high traffic point-to-point locations 
between countries.  This meant that countries with low traffic requirements were 
bypassed.  International cable consortiums, however, offered a way for these countries to 
participate by allowing them to include their traffic in a larger pool and thereby make 
cable projects incorporating them viable. Entities could contribute to the construction of 
the cable and become members of a consortium.   
 
The 1990s saw deregulation of the telecom industry globally and a widening of the types of 
companies participating in the ownership of international cables.  This era also saw the 
emergence (in the mid 1990s) of non-carrier private cable companies with privately owned 
and operated cables, and a return to more centralised ownership structures.7  These cables 
were often built using speculative investment capital and, in retrospect, were based on 
unrealistic forecasts of how much capacity they would be able to sell.  The downturn in 
global financial markets in the late 90s had a significant and sometimes fatal impact on 
many of these companies, with infrastructure being sold off where it existed.8   
 
Reorganisation of the submarine fibre-optic communications business (in the early 2000s) 
has produced modified ownership structures.  There has been increased participation and a 
return of the dominance of carriers whose core business is the transmission of voice and 
data traffic.  Submarine cables continue to be built by consortia, but some are managed 
and operated by separate private companies – resulting in what is referred to as a hybrid 
structure.  Table 2 summarises the four types of ownership structures that have been 
discussed in this section.  
 
Table 2: Ownership structure of submarine cable systems 
 
Type Description Examples Advantages Disadvantages 
Consortium Built by 
consortium 
operating 
through a 
management 
committee 
SAT-
3/WASC/SAFE 
TAT-14 
Owners get 
capacity at 
cost; financial 
stability 
Conflict 
between large 
and small 
owners; owners 
pay fixed 
operation and 
management 
charges 
regardless of 
actual capacity 
used 
Private Built by start-
ups as a 
speculative 
venture, usually 
operating as 
‘carriers’ 
carriers’.9 In 
some cases 
entrepreneurs 
own the cables, 
in others they 
only manage 
them. Capacity 
FLAG 
Tyco 
Transatlantic 
Hibernia 
Atlantic 
Rapid 
deployment; 
simpler 
management 
Responsibility 
for entire 
construction 
and 
maintenance 
costs 
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Type Description Examples Advantages Disadvantages 
is owned 
outright or on 
Indefeasible 
Right of Use 
(see below) 
basis by third 
parties. 
Co-build Built by two or 
more carriers’ 
carrier; owners 
manage and 
market capacity 
individually 
Tellow/AC-2, 
FLAG/REACH 
North Asia Loop 
Financial risk is 
spread; owners 
get capacity at 
cost 
Owners 
compete against 
each other; may 
introduce too 
much capacity 
into the market 
Hybrid Built by one or 
more carriers, 
but operated 
and managed by 
a separate 
private 
company 
C2C Cable 
Network, 
Australia-Japan 
Cable 
Financial risk is 
spread; simpler 
management 
than traditional 
consortia 
Owners do not 
receive capacity 
at cost 
 
Source: Hamilton, Paul and Telegeography (2004) Identifying key regulatory and policy issues to 
ensure open access to regional backbone infrastructure initiatives in Africa.  Report submitted to The 
Global ICT Policy Division (CITPO), World Bank. p. 16 
 
The ownership structure adopted determines the type of access other service providers 
have to the cable – for instance, whether this will be on an open and competitive basis or 
be closed and monopolistic.   
 
A ‘closed consortium structure’ was adopted for the operation and management of SAT-
3/WASC (Axiom 2005).  In this model of ownership each member of the consortium 
contributes towards the upfront capital cost of building the cable and commits to paying 
for its operational and maintenance costs over its lifespan.  
 
Consortium members pay (or commit to pay) for the entire cable system and its 
maintenance at the start of the project. This influences how they formulate their business 
plans and calculate their returns. They determine the configuration of the cable, agree on 
the funding rules that will cover capital and maintenance costs, and also agree on how 
capacity of the cable will be allocated.  Members of a closed consortium also determine the 
cost at which capacity on the system will be sold or leased to entities that are non-
members.  However, because the cable has already (in principle) been fully paid for, cash 
from additional sales or lease to non-members is of relative low incentive to the 
consortium, especially when there is potential conflict with a desire to protect their 
business plans and returns.  
 
The result has been the emergence and propagation of a monopolistic situation, and severe 
criticism of the cable; an outcome far from SAT-3/WASC being considered:  
 
…[A] shining example in demonstrating the ability of African and Global 
telecommunications companies to work together in harmony towards 
realizing an important building block in pursuit of the development and 
improvement of African infrastructure. (Meyer 2001) 
 
3 SAT-3/WASC 
SAT-3/WASC is a 14,350km undersea fibre-optic cable running along the western coast of 
Africa to the southern part of the continent.  When combined with the SAFE submarine 
cable, it forms part of a larger single network connecting Europe to Asia via western and 
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southern Africa.  The SAT3/WASC portion has a design capacity of 120Gb/s (or 
approximately six-million simultaneous telephone calls) and the SAFE portion a design 
capacity of 130Gb/s. 
 
SAT3/WASC starts at Sesimbra, Portugal, passes through nine African countries, and ends at 
Melkbosstrand, South Africa.  The Africa section of SAT3/WASC (see Figure 3) has the 
following landing points:10 
  
Figure 3: Landing points of the Africa section of SAT3/WASC 
[1] Dakar, Senegal  
[2] Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire 
[3] Accra, Ghana 
[4] Cotonou, Benin 
[5] Lagos, Nigeria 
[6] Douala, Cameroon 
[7] Libreville, Gabon 
[8] Cacuaco, Angola 
[9] Melkbosstrand, South Africa.   
 
SAT-3/WASC was commissioned in 1999 
and entered commercial service in April 
2002. Reported11 amounts invested in 
SAT3/WASC/SAFE differ, and have been 
stated to be as high as US$650-million 
(Jensen 2006; Goldstein 2004).  However, 
a shareholders’ agreement signed on 17 
June 199912 cites the cost of the cable as 
US$595-million.   
 
The consortium that owns the submarine 
cable comprises a mix of African, 
American, Asian, and European (predominantly telecommunication) companies; in total 36 
investors from 35 countries (NITEL 2007; Meyer 2004).  How much each company invested 
and the complete list of who these investors are is hard to ascertain.  Analysis of the 1999 
shareholders’ agreement reveals that the largest investors in the cable are: TCI, a 
subsidiary of AT&T (12.42%), France Telecom (12.08%),13 Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited 
(VSNL) (8.93%), and Nitel (8.39%).  However other sources show different figures.  
Individual participants in the consortium, through their investment, own capacity on the 
cable (calculated in Minimum Investment Unit kilometers (MIU km)).14  Capacity allocations 
can therefore be used as a proxy of the level of investment that was made.  Table 3 
presents allocation figures for some investors. 
 
In June 2003 the capacity of SAT-3/WASC was upgraded to 40Gb/s - a third of its maximum 
design capacity of 120Gb/s.  Yet actual usage of the cable at this time was estimated to 
constitute less than 3% of its design capacity (Goldstein 2004).  While unverified reports 
attribute savings of US$400-million per annum to the SAT-3/WASC cable,15 such utilisation 
figures question the efficacy of the investment that went into constructing the cable - for 
example South Africa and Nigeria are reported to have contributed nearly US$85-million 
and US$50-million respectively (Goldstein 2004).  Demand for capacity is, however, very 
much on the increase, and the recent upgrade of the cable to 120Gb/s in 2007, which most 
African members of the consortium participated in, is beginning to raise concerns about the 
likelihood of capacity on the cable running out.  The question is therefore not one of 
whether demand for capacity exists, but rather, at what cost?  
 
3.1 Sale of capacity on SAT3/WASC 
The sale of SAT3/WASC capacity in each country with a landing station is administered by 
the investment party from that country.  After the construction of the cable, other licensed 
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operators are able to buy the right to use a dedicated amount of capacity through an 
Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU) contract.  
 
Table 3: Investors in SAT3/WASC/SAFE 
 
Geographic Region No. of investors Investors Allocated[?] % of Total
[Meyer 2004] [Various] [Private]
Africa:      12 Angola Telecom 805,270              3%
Camtel 538,604              2%
Cote d'Ivoire Telecom
Ghana Telecom 805,270              3%
Maroc Telecom
Mauritius Telecom 805,270              3%
Nitel 1,723,111           7%
OPT Benin 805,270              3%
OPT Gabon 538,604              2%
Sonatel
Telecom Namibia
Telkom South Africa 4,738,603           20%
America:   4 1 TCI [AT&T Corp]
MCI Worldcom International 805,270              3%
Sprint Communications Co
Teleglobe 1,326,103           6%
Asia:  8 China Telecom
Chunghwa Telecom Ltd Co
Communications Authority of Thailand
Korea Telecom
Reach
Singapore Telecommunications
Telekom Malaysia Berhad 2,263,603           10%
VSL 2,263,603           10%
Europe: 12 Communications Global Network Services (BT)
Belgacom SA
Cable & Wireless Global Network 1,326,103           6%
Cyprus Telecommunications Authority
Deutsche Telekom AG
France Telecom 2,738,603           12%
KPN Royal Dutch Telecom
Marconi 183,047              1%
Portugal Telecom
Swisscom Ltd.
Telecom Italia SpA
Telefonica de Espana
2 Concert 1,638,602           7%
3 Global One Communications
Total[s]: 36 23,304,936         
Notes:
1 At that time a subsidiary of AT&T
2 At the time Concert was a joint venture between BT and AT&T
3 At the time Global One Communications was a joint venture between Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom and Sprint.  It was 
acquired (in its totality) by France Telecom in Jan 2000
 
 
While this provides exclusive and irrevocable right to use the capacity (usually for the life 
period of the cable system), the capacity purchased is also ‘unreturnable’ and comes with 
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an obligation to pay a proportion of the operating cost of the cable and a similar proportion 
of the costs of maintaining it (including any repair costs should the cable be damaged).  An 
IRU does not confer the right to control or manage the cable (this is reserved for cable 
owners/members of the consortium) and the unit price for IRU capacity is usually higher 
than the unit price for club members.   
 
There is also the option to lease capacity from the club members – International Private 
Leased Circuit (IPLC) - for shorter terms and at higher cost than IRUs.  Unsurprisingly, 
consortium members control the availability and prices of IRUs and leases, with capacity 
often being limited.   
 
An analysis of the 1999 shareholders’ agreement states that the cable system is run by a 
Management Committee that makes all decisions, except for those reserved for the 
Purchasing Committee.16 The consortium also has three operational sub-Committees: 
Finance and Commercial; Operations and Maintenance; and Delivery and Restoration.  The 
agreement further states that each consortium member is exclusively responsible for the 
operation and maintenance of its segments of the cable, which might explain why the sale 
of SAT3/WASC capacity in each country with a landing station is administered by the 
investment party from that country.  Furthermore: 
 
Parties using the cable pay an annual charge to landing station owners 
[cable station right of use – ROU] described as being for covering 
operation and maintenance of the landing station.  Landing station 
operators (described as “terminal parties”) are obliged to provide 
connections to the terrestrial systems in their country (something many 
did rather slowly).  And significantly, these terms and conditions should 
not contradict the regulation in place in the countries concerned. 
(Balancing Act 2006) 
 
These arrangements for selling capacity are not in themselves out of the ordinary and are 
comparable to what pertains to cable infrastructure elsewhere that is managed under a 
closed consortium basis. However, in this context, SAT-3/WASC has helped to entrench 
already existing monopolies, and has, arguably, retarded development efforts.  
 
At the time of its conception, most of the African participants in SAT-3/WASC were 
monopoly incumbents operating in pre-liberalised telecommunications markets.  These 
incumbents were sole providers of international services. In most cases their monopolistic 
positions were (and still are in cases) enshrined in the legal framework of the country.  
 
By the time of the commissioning of the cable and up to now, African telecom markets have 
been undergoing various levels of liberalisation.  There are now more operators and service 
providers in each country needing access to the capacity offered by the cable, and they 
have been frustrated by the monopolistic position taken by SAT-3/WASC consortium 
members, who have little incentive to increase traffic on the cable.  The situation is 
further compounded when the drive towards regional integration as a means of facilitating 
the development of the sub-continent is considered.  As SAT-3/WASC is currently the only 
international submarine fibre optic cable servicing sub-Saharan Africa, members of the 
consortium are not only the gatekeepers of reliable (and potentially affordable) 
connectivity to their country, but also to neighbouring coastal countries that are not 
connected to the cable, and those that are landlocked. 
 
The ‘reinforced monopoly’ enjoyed by the consortium member strengthens its position in 
the telecoms market, and when coupled with weak national terrestrial networks – which 
further worsens the cost of connectivity in the country17 - constitutes a major impediment 
to the development of the telecoms and related industries. 
3.2 The case for ‘Open Access’ to SAT-3/WASC 
Some stakeholders and commentators have argued that the key to unlocking the potential 
of SAT-3/WASC lies in the creation of an ‘Open Access’ environment in countries where 
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consortium members operate.  Governments and their agencies are limited in what they 
can ask of the companies operating within the consortium, and are wary of the potentially 
harmful impact interference of a business contractual agreement can have on current and 
future prospects of investment in their respective countries. At the same time, the 1999 
agreement states that: 
 
No signatory can sell, transfer or dispose of any rights or obligations in 
relation to the fibre without the permission of the Management 
Committee.  Furthermore (24.2) parties are bound to the terms of the 
agreement and these terms supersede those that any corporate entity 
might take to itself within their national jurisdictions. (Balancing Act 
2006) 
 
However, signatories to the SAT-3/WASC contract must also work within the laws and 
regulations of the countries in which they operate.  The call for Open Access presents an 
opportunity for governments and their agencies to create opportunities for fair and low-
cost access to SAT-3/WASC by establishing and maintaining an environment in which:18  
 
 All legitimate current and future operators have access to capacity without undue 
distortion (fair competition);  
 Access to facilities is unconstrained and at a fair price;  
 Mechanisms to secure low prices to end-users are put in place; and 
 In the case of submarine cable infrastructure, landlocked countries are not 
disadvantaged.  
 
APC’s study was limited in scope to the areas that Open Access seeks to address - namely 
access and cost. Its thesis is that an ‘open’ environment can be created in relation to SAT-
3/WASC by dismantling the monopolies that signatories enjoy in three areas: 
 
 Cable infrastructure - as owners of the only submarine fibre cable in sub-Saharan 
Africa; 
 International Gateway – which ensures that consortium members are (often) the 
only operators that can legally bring international traffic into and take it out of the 
country; 
 Landing stations – which enables consortium members to charge high access and 
inter-connection charges to use the facility. 
4 APC country case-study research 
4.1 Methodology 
A case study approach was adopted for the APC study. This was felt to be an appropriate 
approach in examining the issues relating to SAT-3/WASC in the context in which they 
occur.19  The approach looked to facilitate an understanding of the unique factors and 
circumstances prevailing in each country that influenced access to and the cost of SAT-
3/WASC capacity.   
 
The study was conducted by a team of researchers that were largely resident in each of the 
countries under investigation. At least two researchers worked on each country study.  Key 
activities during the research comprised the analysis of documents and reports, collation of 
pre-defined performance indicators using a standardised template specifically developed 
for the research, and a series of face-to-face interviews with a cross-section of relevant 
stakeholder groups, including telecom operators – fixed-line, mobile and Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) - government representatives, regulators and civil society.20   
 
 APC Publications The Case for “Open Access” Communications Infrastructure in Africa:  
The SAT-3/WASC cable– A briefing                                                                                              13 
Specific areas covered by the case studies are as follows: 
 
 Description of the country’s telecom market.  This included a brief description of 
the SAT-3/WASC consortium member, and changes in the country's telecom 
environment (regulation, number of players etc.) prior to and after the 
commissioning of SAT-3/WASC;   
 Performance indicators assessing the success of the country’s utilisation of SAT-
3/WASC.  This included capacity utilisation, cost of services, subscription and usage 
figures.  Where relevant, these indicators were compared with alternative 
infrastructure such as satellite; 
 Analysis of access.  This included documenting (where data were available) who has 
access to the cable and how this access is decided.  The case studies also focused 
on identifying barriers to access that exist in each country, including regulatory 
(licensing), legal, financial (in terms of cost of access) and political barriers; 
 Overview of the state of the national backhaul infrastructure. This analysis was 
conducted as a proxy for assessing ‘external’ limitations to the performance of the 
SAT-3/WASC cable by measuring the ability of the country to utilise the cable 
irrespective of the barriers that are the result of the consortium member.    
 
4.2 Findings 
This section synthesises information contained in the individual country study reports21 and 
highlights some of the issues and trends that are common to all countries.  It is divided into 
two parts: the first part (4.3.1) summarises the status of the telecoms market in each of 
the countries.  It provides information on the ‘legally permissible levels of competition’ 
that exist in a cross-section of telecom markets in each country.  Legally permissible levels 
of competition refers to sectors of the market in which, according to the country’s laws and 
regulations, more than one operator can offer services.  However, what is permissible does 
not always equate to what pertains in the market.  Section 4.3.1 therefore also discusses 
actual numbers of companies that are operational in these sectors, and identifies the 
ownership status of these operators, in particular the national fixed-line operator/s in the 
country.   
 
The second part (4.3.2) looks at the performance of the telecommunications sector of each 
case country. Particular emphasis is placed on cost of bandwidth since the commissioning of 
SAT-3/WASC and on the impact increases in the availability of bandwidth has had on the 
price of international calls and Internet services. 
 
4.2.1 Level of competition in telecom markets 
The SAT-3/WASC signatories that are operational in the countries studied as part of this 
research operate in monopolistic or ‘biased’ duopolistic markets (see Table 4).   
 
While a review of the telecom regulation and laws of countries such as Angola and Senegal 
give the impression that their telecom markets are (for the most part) fully liberalised, in 
reality, this is not the case.  For example, Angola is cited as having four licensed fixed-line 
operators; these are Angola Telecom, MS Telecom, Mundo Startel, and Wezacom.  
However, at the time of this research, only two - Angola Telecom and MS Telecom - were 
operational.  Furthermore, both operators are state-owned entities.  MS Telecom is a 
subsidiary of Sonangol - the Government-owned oil parastatal, and Angola Telecom is the 
100% government-owned incumbent.   
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Table 4: Liberalisation of telecom markets 
 
4.1 Legally Permissable Levels of Competition 4.2 Status of Fixed Operator(s) 4.3 Number of Operators (2006)
Local Services C Angola Telecom SO National Teleco Operators 5
Long Distance (Domestic) C MS Telecom SO Cellular Mobile Operators 2
Long Distance (International) C Mundo Startel FP Internet Service Providers 4
Wireless Local Loop C Wezacom FP VSAT Operators na
Data C
VSAT na
Leased Lines C
Mobile P
Cable TV P
Internet Services C
International Gateways C
Local Services M CAMTEL SO National Teleco Operators 1
Long Distance (Domestic) M Cellular Mobile Operators 2
Long Distance (International) M Internet Service Providers na
Wireless Local Loop C VSAT Operators na
Data C
VSAT P
Leased Lines na
Mobile C
Cable TV C
Internet Services C
International Gateways na
Local Services P Ghana Telecom SO National Teleco Operators 2
Long Distance (Domestic) P WESTEL SO Cellular Mobile Operators 4
Long Distance (International) P Internet Service Providers 29
Wireless Local Loop P VSAT Operators 57
Data C
VSAT C
Leased Lines C
Mobile P
Cable TV C
Internet Services C
International Gateways P
Local Services C SONATEL PP National Teleco Operators 1
Long Distance (Domestic) C Cellular Mobile Operators 2
Long Distance (International) C Internet Service Providers 13
Wireless Local Loop C VSAT Operators na
Data C
VSAT C
Leased Lines C
Mobile C
Cable TV na
Internet Services C
International Gateways C
Notes:
Table 1.1 reflects what is legally permissible in each country and may not represent what actually pertains in the market
M - Monopoly; P - Partial competition; C - Full competition; na - Not available
SO - State-owned; PP - Partially privatised; FP - Fully privatised
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Source: ITU World Telecommunication Regulatory Database and websites of relevant national telecom 
regulators and/or ministry of communications. 
 
 
By having two state-financed telecoms entities which have shareholdings in all of the major 
sectors of the market22, the Angolan telecom market can be described as a ‘biased’ duopoly 
– government is literally in competition with itself (although Angola telecom remains the 
dominant operator).   
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A similar situation (i.e. a ‘biased’ duopoly with a dominant incumbent) also exists in Ghana.  
There are two national fixed-line telecom operators in Ghana - Ghana Telecom and Western 
Telesystems (Westel) – and both were, at the time of this research, 100% government 
owned.23  Ghana Telecom, however, dominates the fixed-line telecom market: by mid-2007 
Westel only had approximately 3,000 fixed lines (all located in Accra) compared to Ghana 
Telecom’s 370,000 lines nationwide.   
 
In comparison to the market for fixed lines, the mobile market in Ghana is significantly 
more liberalised.  There are currently four mobile operators in Ghana: Scancom (which is 
owned by MTN and operates under the brand name Areeba), Ghana Telecom Mobile (owned 
by Ghana Telecom and operating under the brand name Onetouch), Mobitel (owned by 
Millicom Ghana and operating under the brand name Tigo), and Kasapa Telecom (a 
subsidiary of Hutchison Telecommunications International and operator of the only Code 
Division Multiple Access (CDMA) cellular network in the country under the brand name 
Kasapa). The number of active companies notwithstanding, there is a limit to how 
competitive the mobile market actually is. Scancom and Ghana Telecom Mobile control a 
significant proportion of the market and are estimated to carry 88% of the total mobile 
network traffic in Ghana.24  
 
If the fixed-line markets in Angola and Ghana operate as ‘biased’ duopolies, those of 
Cameroon and Senegal operate as monopolies, even though on paper these markets can 
operate under full (Senegal) and/or partial (Cameroon) competition (see Table 4).   
 
In Cameroon, the market for fixed lines operates under the monopoly of Cameroon 
Telecommunications Corporation (Camtel).  Although the government has made repeated 
attempts to privatise the company, its most recent effort (in November 2003) led to a 
reinforcement of Camtel’s monopoly position.  This came about as a result of a provisional 
concession Camtel signed with the government to manage the fixed network and services 
for a two-year period (renewable for a further two years).  Camtel was required to connect 
40,000 new lines and increase the number of public payphones throughout the country.  
The contract gave Camtel up to four years of exclusivity on the provision of fixed-line 
services in order to achieve these growth targets.   
 
In addition to being the only national fixed-line operator, Camtel also provides data and 
satellite services, and calling cards.  Its subsidiary, Camnet, provides Internet and 
broadband services, and in 2006 it created a new mobile telephone company called 
Cameroon Mobile Telecommunications Corporation (CMT) to compete with the country’s 
two (more established) mobile operators, MTN and Orange.25  The research was unable to 
confirm the number of ISPs and VSAT operators in the country. However, some level of 
competition is thought to exist in these markets.  Cameroon has a large number of grey-
market VSAT and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) operators (see section 4.3.2), which 
have emerged to fill the demand that Camtel’s poor network has been unable to fill.  Their 
emergence has also been facilitated by Camtel’s inability to enforce its monopoly in the 
market for international services. 
 
The national fixed-line operator in Senegal is the Senegalese National Telecom Company 
(Sonatel), which has been partially privatised (France-Telecom has a majority 
shareholding). While the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) reports that 
competition is permissible in all sectors of the Senegalese telecom market, in reality this is 
not yet the case.  Sonatel’s monopoly in the fixed-line market ended in 2004; but at the 
time of this research a second national operator licence had yet to be awarded.  There are 
two mobile operators in Senegal - Sonatel’s mobile arm (which operates under the brand 
name Alize); and Sentel - a subsidiary of Millicom International Cellular (MIC) (operating 
under the brand name Tigo). Contrary to what is legally permissible, the international 
gateway market in Senegal is not yet competitive and Sonatel is the only company that 
offers connectivity to international bandwidth.  As a result, even its competitor in the 
mobile market, Sentel, must route all international calls from its mobile network through 
Sonatel.  In a similar manner, all ISPs are obliged to pass their international traffic through 
Sonatel.  The research was unable to confirm the number of ISPs and VSAT operators in the 
country.  However, a 2004 Spintrack report is quoted as stating that at the time of their 
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report – and due to the monopoly enjoyed by Sonatel on the provision of satellite and 
international services - no VSAT licences had been issued in Senegal. 
 
Global experience of telecom reform has shown that in many instances, the liberalisation of 
markets and the emergence of real competition, as multiple operators provide services to 
consumers, improves the efficiency of markets; much more so than the mere privatisation 
of the incumbent operator.  On the one hand, with the exception of Sonatel, none of the 
other signatories to SAT-3/WASC studied as part of this research were privatised.  These 
100% government-owned entities often constitute a conflict of interest in the markets that 
they operate in and (usually) dominate, impeding sector reforms and constituting 
operational bottlenecks.  On the other hand, and perhaps more significantly, with the 
exception of Ghana Telecom, all other SAT-3/WASC signatories studied in this research are 
legally the sole providers of international connectivity in their countries.   
 
This scenario, in most cases, constitutes a ‘reinforced monopoly’ – state-owned operators 
who are sole providers of international connectivity in un-competitive markets face little 
incentive to offer fair access and prices to other operators and consumers.  The impact this 
has had on the performance of telecom markets in the case countries is discussed in the 
following section. 
 
4.2.2 Performance of telecom markets 
All of the countries studied have experienced increases in international bandwidth capacity 
available in the country. They have experienced decreases in the cost of international 
bandwidth, both on SAT-3/WASC and from its ‘alternative’, satellite (see Table 5).  The 
cost of Internet access to consumers has also decreased over time. This has also been the 
case regarding the cost of international calls.   
 
4.2.2.1 Bandwidth capacity and utilisation 
At the commissioning of SAT3/WASC. Angola Telecom was allocated a total capacity of 
805,270 MIU km,26 and an assigned capacity of 62,675 MIU km.  The operator has since used 
up its original allocation and was at the time of this research in the process of upgrading its 
capacity. Likewise Cameroon Telecom (Camtel), whose success in marketing SAT3/WASC 
has been very limited,27 has nonetheless increased its allocation on the cable.  In December 
2006, Camtel bought additional MIU km to stock up its capacity by about 30%, and in March 
2007 stated that it was using 60% of its allocated capacity.  In Cameroon, Camtel is by far 
the biggest user of SAT-3/WASC capacity (this is the case for the incumbents in all the 
other countries studied). It is estimated to use approximately 50% of Cameroon’s allocated 
capacity on SAT3/WASC, which corresponds to more than 80% of all used capacity.  The 
bulk of the remaining capacity is used by only a handful of large companies that are 
connected directly to the cable.28 
 
Of the countries studied, Senegal has witnessed the greatest increase in bandwidth.  This 
has increased from 42Mb/s in May 2002 (the year in which SAT-3/WASC was commissioned) 
to 1.24Gb/s in the five years until 2007.  Between the launch of SAT-3/WASC and November 
2004, bandwidth in Senegal was upgraded on more than 11 occasions.  The last upgrade 
(prior to this research) was in October 2006, which brought the country’s capacity up to the 
1.24Gb/s. Senegal’s bandwidth capacity is available (through Sonatel) to neighbouring 
countries including Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali and Mauritania.  
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Table 5: Performance overview of telecom markets  
 
Name of Operator
Fixed line monopoly? No 1 Yes No 1 Yes
International gateway monopoly Yes No No Yes
SAT3 only submarine cable? Yes Yes Yes No
Amount invested (US$mil) 24 20 24 24
Percentage shareholding 2 4% 3% 4% 4%
Capacity allocated (MIU*Km) 805,270  'confidential' 805,270 na
International  bandwidth [Mbps] na as at 2002 9 as at 2002 4 as at 2002 60 as at 2002
na as at 2006 310 as at 2006 40 as at 2006 1024 as at 2006
Year sale of SAT3 capacity 2002 2002/2005 2002 2002
Cost of access - SAT3 [E1/month 25,000.00           as at 2003 up to 22400.00 as at 2003 12,000.00              as at 2003 na as at 2003
US$] 14,400.00           as at 2006 3 4,400.00             as at 2006 4 up to 12,000.00 as at 2006 5 7,468.00             as at 2006 6
Cost of Satellite [1Mb/month US$] 7 na as at 2003 9,000.00             as at 2003 15,000.00              as at 2001 na as at 2003
up to 12,000 as at 2006 3,700.00             as at 2006 5,500.00                as at 2006 na as at 2006
Operator's Dial-up Charges [US$] 8 Corporate Residential Corporate Residential Corporate Residential Corporate Residential
 - monthly 82.97                   11.52                  na na 17.76 17.76 Connection
33.69                   4.68                    308.41 79.44 9 na na 11.96 11.96 Subscription
Operator's ADSL Charges [US$] ADSL ADSL Plus ADSL ADSL PRO B4U B4U 12 Royalty-Line Royalty-ISP Download speed
 - monthly 136.49                 142.99                10 560.75                560.75            11 155.55 256
166.58                 203.16                10 934.58                11 274.81 47.83 34.24 13 512
1,308.41             11 321.47 181.48 246.57 214.43 13 1024
300.13 223.61 13 2048
ANGOLA CAMEROON GHANA SENEGAL
Angola Telecom Société Nationale des TélécommunicationsGhana TelecomCameroon Telecom
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NOTES:
1 Fixed line operators are however government owned entities
2 Calculations based on cost of US$650 million 
3 Price is per mbps per month duplex to Portugal
4 Price some organisations have been able to negotiate per month for an E1 link (2Mb/s full duplex). Advertised price by Camtel in 2003 was US$12,500 (reduced to US$7,500 since 2006)
5 Price of E1 per month to Europe and America for GISPA (Ghana ISP Association) members. Price to non-GISPA is $8000/month and to non-ISPs is $12000/month
6 Comprised of approximately US$1,402 settlement fee and US$6,066 monthly cost for 2048Kbps line
7 Average Satellite Price (1 Mbit) – duplex. Not fully comparable with SAT3 due to different service characteristics
8 Monthly estimates based on annual contract.  Actual full costs to users will be substantially more once phone line costs are included.
9 Corporate: Refers to RNIS product (Internet via ISDN). Made up of 50,000FCFA expense account; 15,500FCFA modem hire and 100,000 router hire.
9
10 Prices quoted are highest of two options - product termed "Kz".  Price includes installation. 1 Angolan Kwanza = 0.01337 USD
11
12
13 Price includes a one-off installation price of 11,500 FCFA ($US 22) for ADSL 512, and 103,000 FCFA ($US 193) for ADSL 1024 and 2048
Residential: Refers to RTC product (internet via switched telephone network with throughput of 56kbps). Made up of 25,000FCFA expense account and 17,500FCFA for 50 hours usage. 500FCFA for each additional hour.
535FCFA = 1USD conversion rate. Includes one time installation fee of 100,000FCFA. The low-end 128/64 package is the most commonly used one. The top three packages (256/128; 512/256; 1024/512) are virtually exclusively used by 
the corporate sector
Ghana Telecom's Broadband4U prices (B4U). Includes US$93 installation fee for all products (1USD = 9,639.83GHC). All options listed are for dynamic Ips (rather than static). 1024/256Kbps option listed under Residential is for Schools 
only
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With respect to capacity utilisation, the one exception in the case studies was Ghana.  The 
SAT-3/WASC cable provides Ghana with a total allocated capacity of 805,270 MIU km and an 
assigned capacity of 66,875 MIU km.  This research estimated the country’s utilisation to be 
about 10-15% (6 STM1s)29 of the cable’s capacity into the country.30  Sources interviewed 
during the course of this research, however, projected that utilisation would increase to 15 
STM1s by 2011. 
 
4.2.2.2 Cost of international bandwidth (wholesale) 
The cost of international bandwidth has also decreased - although not to levels anticipated 
by the market (given the potential of SAT-3/WASC).  In Angola, the incumbent’s (Angola 
Telecom) monopoly on the international gateway and the resulting lack of competition 
meant that there was little to no incentive to reduce international bandwidth prices.  
Unsurprisingly, Angola Telecom kept the prices for SAT-3/WASC bandwidth high and only 
recently reviewed them downwards, predominantly as a result of political rather than 
market pressure.  In the years immediately following the commissioning of the cable, the 
costs of SAT-3/WASC bandwidth was often the same as or more expensive than satellite 
bandwidth.   
 
Since SAT-3/WASC came into service, Angola Telecom has reduced the cost of wholesale 
bandwidth on the fibre twice, once in June 2005 and again in October 2006.  The initial 
price for this bandwidth appears to have been around US$20,000 per Mb/s per month 
duplex to Portugal.  The first reduction of 20% took it down to around US$16,000, and the 
subsequent reduction of 10% down to US$14,400.  International satellite prices have also 
come down in two stages in Angola (at the same time as that of SAT-3/WASC) with a first 
reduction of 10% followed by a further reduction of 5%.  Satellite prices vary between 
US$4,000-5,000 duplex, but still appear to be cheaper than fibre in some instances.  
Discussions with operators have established that the prices being charged are between 
US$3,500-12,000 per Mb/s per month, depending on volumes used.   
 
Ghana Telecom implements a differential pricing mechanism with respect to access to SAT-
3/WASC capacity.  The price a prospective buyer pays differs according to the type of 
licence they hold and whether or not they are members of the Ghana ISP Association 
(GISPA).  Registered members of GISPA pay US$4,010 for a bi-directional (full duplex) 2Mb/s 
link (E1) connection, while non-GISPA ISPs are charged US$8,000 for the same capacity.  
The costs are even higher for buyers that are not ISPs, who pay US$12,000 for the same E1 
connection - which is the price Ghana Telecom used to charge all wholesale buyers when 
the cable was first commissioned five years ago.  Our research was unable to ascertain the 
cost basis (if one exists) behind this pricing difference, and assumes that it has been largely 
in response to successful lobbying on the part of GISPA.  The research also found that the 
average price for an ‘equivalent’ satellite connection (of 1 Mb/s duplex) in Ghana during 
2007 was approximately US$5,500. This represents a significant reduction from the amount 
that would have been paid in 2001, which is estimated to have been approximately 
US$15,000. 
 
Research findings on Cameroon show a clear correlation between increased availability and 
reductions in the price of wholesale bandwidth on SAT-3/WASC, and the cost of satellite 
bandwidth (see Figure 4).  Prior to the arrival of SAT-3/WASC in 2002, satellite was the only 
way of getting international bandwidth into the country.  Despite competition between 
various international providers in the Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) sector in 
Cameroon, prices remained high - around FCFA8-million to FCFA9-million (approximately 
US$11,500) per month for a 1Mb/s downlink and 512Kb/s uplink.  Even though Camtel did 
not connect the first wholesale customers to SAT-3/WASC until 2005, in 2003 it began to 
advertise E1 links for FCFA7-million (around US$12,500).  VSAT providers reacted to this by 
reducing their prices by approximately 35% to around FCFA5-million.31  The providers were 
able to maintain a price margin above Camtel's SAT-3/WASC pricing until 2005. However, 
once Camtel connected its first wholesale fibre customers, the price for dedicated VSAT 
bandwidth fell below Camtel's ‘equivalent’ SAT-3/WASC pricing for the first time.  Camtel 
responded to this (in 2006) by reducing its price for an E1 by more than 40% to FCFA4-
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million/month.  Furthermore, as some ISPs gained more bargaining power through organic 
growth, as well as mergers and acquisitions, discounts of up to 40% on this list price have 
been achieved, with some companies paying as ‘little’ as FCFA2.4-million (US$4,400) per 
month for a SAT-3/WASC E1.  The VSAT providers, in response, are now offering 1Mb/s 
downlink for as little as FCFA1.1-million per month (approximately US$2,000). 
 
Figure 4: Price of wholesale bandwidth, SAT-3/WASC vs. VSAT, 2000 – 2006 
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Source: Interviews with major ISPs with access to SAT-3 bandwidth. 
Note 1: Fibre and VSAT bandwidth prices are not fully comparable due to different service 
characteristics. 
Note 2: Part of the reason for the declining VSAT cost is that the US$ lost around 25% of its 
value against the FCFA between 2002 and 2004. 
 
While Senegal was identified as the country with the most improvement in bandwidth 
availability, data for both fibre and satellite wholesale bandwidth prices were difficult to 
obtain and verify with the operator Sonatel.  The following extract from the country report 
highlights the extent of the problem faced during the data collection process: 
 
Attempts at scheduling interviews and discussions with several officials 
also proved difficult, if not impossible. It took over two months to meet 
the first Sonatel official for an interview. Most of the questions posed 
during the interview, especially those related to earnings, expenses and 
SAT-3/WASC-related figures, were not answered. Other requests for data 
were also not forthcoming. (Senegal Case Study Report) 
 
4.2.2.3 Cost of international calls for consumers (retail) 
The extent to which decreases in the cost of international calls and increases in 
international call and data traffic can be directly attributed to SAT-3/WASC is open to 
contention.  The markets for international and Internet services in each of the countries 
have, at the same time as the commissioning of SAT-3/WASC, also experienced increases in 
the number of (legal and grey market) operators providing services, and the ensuing 
competition has had a positive impact on reducing prices.  This in turn may have had some 
impact on international outgoing traffic from these countries.   
 
Figure 5 shows the trend in international outgoing fixed-line telephonic traffic in the 
countries studied.  It highlights an upwards trend in the number of minutes of international 
calls that were being made by the population of each country on its fixed-line network.  
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While all the other countries appear to have witnessed gradual increases in traffic since the 
commissioning of SAT-3/WASC, Senegal registered a dramatic increase post-2004. 
 
Figure 5: International outgoing fixed-telephone traffic 
 
 
 
Source: ITU (2007) World Telecommunications Indicators Database 
Note 1: 2004 data not available for Ghana so prior year’s figure (62 million) is used. 
 
Prior to 2002, tariffs to international destinations in Senegal were between US$0.74 and 
US$1.3 per minute, depending on the destinations.  This has fallen to US$0.24 per minute 
to all the destinations during off-peak hours, and US$0.20 per minute between 18h00 – 
23h00 and between 07h00 – 08h00.  Calls cost as little as US$0.10 per minute during ‘night 
hours’ – that is from 23h00 to 07h00.  
 
The pattern of tariff reductions on international communication by Sonatel since 2002 is as 
follows: 
 
 May 2002: 12% tariff reduction on phone calls outside of Africa; 
 April 2003: further 15% tariff reduction during peak periods;  
 June 2004: 33% tariff reduction and implementation of a single tariff irrespective of 
destination;  
 May 2005: 11% tariff reduction per minute during peak time, 6% reduction during 
off-peak peak periods and 37% reduction on calls made between 11pm and 8am; 
 May 2006: 18% price reduction on international calls and harmonization of times 
(i.e. no longer categorising calling times into peak and off-peak). 
 
The implementation of a single tariff irrespective of destination coincides with the peak in 
traffic shown in Figure 5 and can be considered a stimulus for increases in outgoing 
international traffic.  SAT-3/WASC, together with the use of VoIP (made possible due to 
increased availability of higher quality bandwidth), have been key factors in lowering tariffs 
on international communications.   
 
A similar downward trend in the price of international communications was reported in 
Cameroon (see Figure 6).  Here the observed impact of SAT-3/WASC on international tariffs 
is twofold.  Firstly, the commissioning of the cable coincided with a temporary halt in the 
downward trend of international call tariffs.  International tariffs had halved between 2000 
and 2002, but remained virtually flat in the following three years to 2004/2005.  It is 
possible that Camtel, facing a dwindling or (at best) stagnant customer base countered 
falling revenues by raising tariffs or at least keeping them constant.  It was able to do this 
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due to the higher quality of international connections that became available using SAT-
3/WASC capacity, compared to satellite.  Renewed downward pressure on international 
tariffs only came in 2005 when the mobile operators gained access to Camtel’s SAT-3/WASC 
bandwidth. 
 
Figure 6: International call rates in Cameroon 
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Fig. 18: International call rates in Cameroon, 2000 – 2006 
Source: MTN and various VoIP service providers in Cameroon. 
Note 1: MTN Zone 1 = France and USA, Zone 2 = Rest of world. 
Note 2: In 2006 MTN introduced a special rate of FCFA200 per minute to other MTN networks in 
Africa. 
 
 
Secondly, SAT-3/WASC enabled the larger scale introduction of VoIP services in concert 
with the introduction of wireless broadband services.  Prior to this, the use of VoIP in 
Cameroon was very limited due to the insufficient quality of dial-up and satellite links used 
for connectivity by ISPs and cyber-cafés.  In 2002, international VoIP calls to most 
destinations were offered for around FCFA250 per minute, which was about a quarter of the 
price for conventional calls on the fixed-line and mobile networks to the most popular 
destinations.  VoIP rates have declined steadily to as low as FCFA100 per minute in 2006 
(including Camtel's own calling card service), at which time calls on both fixed and mobile 
networks cost between FCFA300 and FCFA400 to the most popular destinations. 
 
In Angola, international rates in 1998 were reported to be around US$2.96 a minute.  By 
2003, Angola Telecom international calling rates had fallen to between US$1.10-2.50 a 
minute, and by the first quarter of 2007 these rates were around US$0.90 a minute for 
more popular calling destinations.  International calls are even cheaper via Angola’s 
thriving grey market which operates through the country’s cyber-cafés or using ‘leaky’ 
Private Automatic Branch Exchanges (PABXs).  International calls to main destinations 
through this channel are between US$0.25-0.31 a minute.  The cost of international calls in 
Ghana has witnessed a similar decline, although a historical account was not collated for 
this case country. In 2001, a call to the US cost US$1.50 per minute; this had reduced to 
approximately US$0.50 per minute by 2006. 
 
4.2.2.4 Cost of Internet services for consumers (retail) 
Decreases in the cost of Internet services since the commissioning of SAT-3/WASC was 
observed in all the case countries studied.  In addition, an increase in the adoption of 
wireless and broadband connections to the Internet was also observed by the research. 
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However, both these trends have not been at anticipated levels, particularly in light of the 
potential offered by fast and high-quality SAT-3/WASC bandwidth.  
 
The research found that a significant proportion of the Angolan market has gone over to 
either wireless or Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) broadband connections, but that prices do 
not appear to have come down.  This is despite reductions in the wholesale price of both 
national and international bandwidth (see discussion in section 4.3.2.2).  Angola Telecom 
currently offers two tariff plans for its Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) service, 
ADSL and ADSL Plus, which vary according to contention ratios and download limits.  The 
ADSL service costs US$99 for a 256Kb/s download speed and US$149 for a 512Kb/s download 
speed.  The equivalent on ADSL Plus costs US$150 and US$250 respectively.   
 
By way of comparison, Angola Telecom’s cable TV subsidiary TV Cabo offers three 
broadband tariffs: Residential, Professional and Mega. Prices vary between US$100 and 
US$320 per month.  Prices offered for mobile data services by Angola Telecom’s mobile 
operator, Movicel, vary depending on whether the subscriber is a pre- or post-paid 
customer.  Three download speeds are offered: 150Kb/s (costing US$112/month), 300Kb/s 
(US$173/month) and 1Mb/s (US$254/month). The latter is currently only available in the 
capital Luanda. 
 
Price decreases were also recorded for dial-up, wireless and ADSL products in Cameroon.  
Camnet launched ADSL at the end of 2005 with speeds ranging from 128/64Kb/s to 
1024/512Kb/s - the low-end 128/64Kb/s package is the most commonly used one.  The 
high-speed packages were found to be virtually exclusively used by the corporate sector.  
Camtel’s ADSL product attracts a one-time installation fee, which is typically around 
FCFA100,000 (US$187) and the modem is rented (i.e. it remains the property of the service 
provider).  The 128/64Kb/s package – the most popular one - costs FCFA49,000 (US$92) per 
month.  Tariffs for dial-up packages have also reduced over time.  These have decreased 
twice: Once in 2002, the year SAT-3/WASC was commissioned, and again in 2006 after SAT-
3/WASC bandwidth had become available on the wholesale market.  However, the 
relevance of dial-up as an Internet access method is now decreasing quickly as wireless 
options and ADSL are increasingly becoming available.  Many residential households have 
also terminated their dial-up subscriptions when Internet access became available at the 
workplace. 
 
In Ghana Internet dial-up costs in 2006 ranged from US$25-$35 per month.  The average 
installation cost for broadband was US$120, with monthly subscription fees of 
approximately US$65 per month.  Broadband prices however vary across operators and are 
difficult to compare.  Ghana Telecom’s Broadband4U charges are the lowest in the country.  
Monthly charges for Broadband4U products vary from US$66 for a residential customer with 
download/upload speeds of 256/64Kb/s, to US$290 for business customers with speeds of 
1024/256Kb/s.  All Broadband4U products attract an additional (one-time) installation fee 
of US$99.   
 
In Senegal, Sonatel has offered a number of tariff reductions over the years, especially with 
its ADSL service offering.  The cost of its ADSL 256 product was reduced by 15% in February 
2003 to US$87.  Further price reductions were experienced in May 2003, with the 
introduction of ADSL 512Kb/s and a tariff reduction of 48.7% on ADSL 256Kb/s.  April 2004 
saw another drop of 39% and a further 50% on the cost of a range of ADSL products 256-
1024Kb/s.  There were other promotions in October 2004, and more recently in May 2005 
during which the following reductions occurred: 
 
 Drop by 54% on ADSL 256Kb/s and 512Kb/s, and tariff reduction of 49% on ADSL 
1024Kb/s;  
 Monthly subscription for 256Kb/s and 512Kb/s lines fell by 22% and 60% respectively;  
 Drop by 74% on the monthly subscription for ADSL 1024Kb/s;  
 Introduction of ADSL 2048Kb/s: a customer subscribing to 1024Kb/s can benefit from 
2048Kb/s while paying less than 44.70% of his/her invoice;  
 Price tariff of 512Kb/s made equivalent to cost of 256Kb/s. 
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In May 2006, price discounts of 30% by Sonatel and 20% by Sentel Internet (Senegal’s second 
mobile operator) were made for 1024Kb/s and 2048Kb/s. This particular price reduction is 
credited with raising the subscription rate of ADSL subscribers in the country to 20,000 from 
18,000 (the subscription figure in December 2005). 
 
The ability to connect to SAT-3/WASC via Senegal’s Sonatel has also had an impact on 
Internet access costs in neighbouring Mali.  Ikatel, Mali’s second mobile operator (and a 
subsidiary of Sonatel), launched its ADSL services in September 2006.  ADSL 128Kb/s costs 
US$43 per month – this in comparison to Sonatel’s US$38 per month ADSL 518Kb/s (twice as 
much capacity) that can be obtained in Senegal.   
 
Although a wider range of broadband speeds are available in Senegal and costs and prices 
of bandwidth and Internet access are comparatively lower than other case study countries 
(and sub-Sahara Africa countries in general), the performance of Sonatel in utilising its SAT-
3/WASC capacity is still criticised in Senegal. Respondents to our research noted that after 
four to five years of Sonatel’s ADSL services in Senegal, the price of connectivity could and 
should be more affordable and the number of subscribers higher.  Sonatel’s pricing of its 
ADSL products was compared to France Telecom’s offering in France (respondents viewed 
this as a comparison of tariffs of ‘the same company’), which indicated that the cost of 
Sonatel’s 1Mb/s product is 240% more than what France Telecom charges in France (and 
this price excludes the cost of initial installation of US$193). 
 
4.3 Discussion of Findings 
The section above (section 4.3) has outlined some of the key findings relating to the 
ownership structure of the telecom markets of the countries studied by this research, and 
has provided examples of the performance of these markets since the commissioning of 
SAT-3/WASC. Particular emphasis was on the markets for international and Internet 
services. The findings show that while cost and prices have in general decreased, these 
reductions have not been commensurate with the potential offered by SAT-3/WASC.  This 
potential is the focus of the next section, which discusses how increasing access to SAT-
3/WASC bandwidth, and reductions in cost of access and prices to consumers, can improve 
international connectivity in the case countries.  This section also identifies barriers to 
improving connectivity. 
 
4.3.1 Increase in bandwidth capacity and reduction in cost of access 
Unsurprisingly, the amount of bandwidth capacity available in each of the case countries 
was found to have increased over time, and each signatory was found to have upgraded its 
capacity on the cable. These increases in capacity have been accompanied by decreases in 
the cost of access.  For example, in 2003 the advertised monthly cost in Cameroon (by 
Camtel) for an E1 link was US$12,500; by 2006 some organisations had been able to 
negotiate this cost to US$4,400 per month.  It is anticipated that reductions in the cost of 
access to SAT-3/WASC capacity will lead to decreases in the price of broadband products to 
consumers. This is analysed in section 4.4.4 below. 
 
Table 6 below presents international bandwidth statistics from the ITU 2007 database on 
telecom and ICT indicators.  Only SAT-3/WASC/SAFE signatory countries with complete data 
sets for the years indicated are presented in the table (these are the three years prior to 
the commissioning of the cable and four years after it became operational).  The table also 
presents the compounded average growth rate (CAGR) in international bandwidth for the 
periods pre- and post- the commissioning of the cable.   
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Table 6: International internet bandwidth (Mb/s) 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 CAGR-pre CAGR-post
Case Study Countries
Angola 1.1 1.1 2.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 68.0 191.0 59.19% 93.73%
Senegal 4.1 36.0 48.0 79.0 310.0 465.0 775.0 1240.0 110.03% 73.44%
SAT3/ WASC/ SAFE Signatories
Benin 0.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 47.0 47.0 45.0 47.0 100.48% 86.20%
Cape Verde 0.5 1.0 2.0 3.0 8.0 10.0 14.0 24.0 55.74% 51.57%
Gabon 0.5 0.5 0.5 8.0 45.0 155.0 200.0 200.0 99.01% 90.37%
Maurit ius 6.1 6.0 10.0 34.0 63.0 71.0 153.0 192.0 53.46% 41.37%
> 100Mb sub-Saharan Africa Countries
Kenya 2.5 10.5 26.0 26.0 26.0 34.0 113.4 758.6 79.58% 96.34%
Burkina Faso 1.0 1.0 2.0 8.0 12.0 64.0 72.0 215.0 68.18% 93.14%
Uganda 0.8 1.7 5.1 7.7 10.0 60.5 60.5 133.0 77.83% 76.80%
Mali 3.0 3.0 3.0 6.0 6.0 18.0 26.0 310.0 18.92% 120.11%
Zambia 0.3 2.1 2.1 5.1 12.0 22.0 22.0 128.0 110.66% 90.37%
Togo 1.0 1.0 6.0 12.0 14.3 14.3 14.3 100.1 86.12% 52.84%
 
Source: ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators 2007 Database 
 
Two comments can be made based on the data presented in the table above.  First, the 
rate at which SAT-3/WASC countries have been able to utilise the capacity they have access 
to differs.  The ITU quotes Senegal’s capacity as 1240Mb/s in 2006, significantly more than 
any other SAT-3/WASC signatory for which data was available.  This may be due to a variety 
of factors, including the state of the national terrestrial backhaul infrastructure (as 
exemplified by Angola), inefficient marketing of bandwidth (as shown by Cameroon), 
affordability and demand.  It should also be noted (from CAGR figures) that Senegal has 
been consistently increasing its bandwidth in the periods prior to and post SAT-3/WASC.  
Other signatory countries record significant sudden increases in bandwidth as a result of 
connectivity to the cable. 
 
Second, there are countries that are not signatories to SAT-3/WASC that have, none the 
less, been able to significantly improve the international bandwidth available to their 
population. In the case of countries like Kenya and Uganda, this has been to levels much 
higher than what pertains in signatory countries.  The role SAT-3/WASC can play on the 
continent is, however, highlighted by Burkina Faso, Mali and Togo.  These three countries 
have been able to significantly increase their international bandwidth capacity.  Mali is 
connected to SAT-3/WASC via Senegal, while Togo is connected via Benin. A fibre-optic 
cable network linking Niger, Burkina Faso and Benin is also planned, which would provide 
Niger with access to SAT-3/WASC.   
 
4.3.2 Exertion of barriers in supplying access to cable capacity 
While the research found evidence of reductions in cost of access, there was little evidence 
to show that the process of gaining access to SAT-3/WASC capacity through consortium 
members was becoming easier.  Suspicions are raised in the case of Cameroon where 
Camtel – the consortium member - is by far the biggest user of SAT-3/WASC capacity in the 
country, using 50% of the allocated capacity (which corresponds to more than 80% of all 
used capacity in Cameroon).  
 
Various reasons can be suggested to explain this situation - where the incumbent appears to 
be the main beneficiary of SAT-3/WASC, at the exclusion of other players in the market. 
Firstly, the smallest unit of bandwidth sold by SAT-3/WASC is a full E1, and the prices at 
which this is offered is unaffordable for a wide variety of service providers.  Second, the 
poor state of national terrestrial backbones limits the areas where access to the cable is 
available. At the time SAT-3/WASC was commissioned in 2002, Camtel's national backhaul 
infrastructure was insufficient to effectively distribute fibre bandwidth beyond Douala, 
where the landing station is located.   
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A similar situation pertains in Angola. At the commencement of SAT-3/WASC’s operation, 
there was no fibre within the capital Luanda where a large part of international bandwidth 
demand is to be found.  At the time of this research, nearly five years after the opening of 
the SAT-3/WASC landing station, the only piece of operational fibre in the Angolan national 
backbone plan is a route from the southernmost city in the country, Namibe, to Lubango 
and onwards towards the Namibian border. Communications between most locations in 
Angola occurs via microwave links, and mostly via satellite – and these are additional costs 
to the price paid for bandwidth. When providing price information for services in Angola, it 
is therefore often necessary to make the distinction between prices obtainable in the 
capital and locations outside the capital.  
 
The Angola case study offers the example of communications costs for the Lobito office of a 
government environmental organisation - Instituto de Investigação Marinha – in 2005: 
 
The system was installed by SISTEC, and is linked to a telephone installed 
by Angola Telecom. The installation cost of the e-mail and Internet 
system was US$6,400, and the monthly subscription is approximately 
US$350-1,000, depending on the number of telephone calls and time 
spent online ... (Angola Case Study Report) 
 
In addition, for those of its offices where there is not a microwave or fibre link, the 
organisation was quoted between US$487,50-1387,50 a month on the basis of a 12-month 
contract for a VSAT service to connect it to Luanda. 
 
A third reason offered for the imbalance in access to the SAT-3/WASC cable is that 
consortium members have been accused of using delay tactics in connecting service 
providers they consider to be competitors.  For example, in Cameroon, ISPs were initially 
seen more as competitors than wholesale customers or partners. Even when they were able 
to get connected to the cable, some found that they were not given the capacity they 
requested, and had to embark on further negotiations with Camtel to have their application 
for access completed as agreed.   
 
4.3.3 Increase in the quality and range of products 
The research also found an improvement in the quality and range of products offered in the 
market. Where fibre was available, it was often adopted by service providers, and at times 
at the expense of competing sources of bandwidth (i.e. satellite). However, some countries 
have had more success in the adoption of broadband products than others. For instance, 
the availability of the products is mostly limited by the geographic spread of the national 
terrestrial network, and is therefore often restricted to key urban areas.  
4.3.4 Decrease in the prices of products 
Data from Senegal illustrates the recurring relationship observed by the research between 
increases in available bandwidth capacity and the price of products.  Figure 4 presents an 
example of this relationship using a specific broadband product (ADSL 256) offered by 
Sonatel.  It shows that increases in capacity were accompanied by decreases in the price of 
the product - to the extent that the product has been ‘discontinued’ and replaced by a 
higher speed/quality offering, ADSL 512Kb/s. 
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Figure 7: Relationship between capacity upgrade and cost of ADSL (256Kb/s) 
 
 
The decrease in prices is welcomed by consumers and is generating (in some circumstances) 
fierce competition at this level of the market.  For example, despite its monopoly position 
in Cameroon, Camtel (through its ownership of SAT-3/WASC) has helped to drive down the 
retail price of Internet services.  Wireless Internet services only became available in 
Cameroon in 2002, the year SAT-3/WASC arrived in the country.  Using the example of 
64Kb/s product,32 the research found that the retail price for 64Kb/s shared wireless 
bandwidth has always remained below the comparable VSAT wholesale price.   
 
Shared bandwidth wireless Internet access was introduced (in 2002) at a retail price 
(FCFA400,000 per month) that was far below the wholesale price for comparable VSAT 
bandwidth (FCFA800,000 per month). This triggered a steep price decline for the VSAT 
product, which in turn caused the price for the shared wireless product to decline much 
faster in percentage terms than the price for dedicated wireless bandwidth.  The price for 
shared VSAT wholesale bandwidth appears to have reached its lowest at about FCFA200,000 
per month, where it has stayed since 2004, while the comparable wireless retail product 
continued its price decline to reach FCFA45,000 per month in 2006 – a mere 20% of the 
VSAT price. The current retail price for 64Kb/s dedicated wireless bandwidth is only 30% 
above that of the shared bandwidth VSAT product (around FCFA275,000 per month). The 
wireless bandwidth, however, offers up to ten times the bandwidth of the VSAT product 
and is more superior in terms of quality and reliability. 
 
However, this is only good news for consumers to an extent, as these decreases in price 
may be masking non-competitive behaviour by the consortium member in the country.  
Such concerns are raised in light of the fact that the cheapest provider of ‘last-mile’ end-
consumer level products and services is often the consortium member (or its subsidiary).  
On occasion – as is the case in Ghana - what the consortium member charges is considerably 
cheaper than prices of the next alternative service provider (as illustrated in Figure 8). 
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Broadband Prices (per month)
 - Download/Upload speeds (kbps)
Unit: US dollars
512/128 kbps
Ghana 
Telecom
Internet 
Ghana
Africa 
Online*
Installation 99 240 600
Subscription 192 225 > 395
* Price for dedicated packages with speeds from 32 kbps. There is 
also an additional cost of USD1,100 for customer premises 
equipment
Figure 8: Difference in pricing of broadband product in the Ghanaian market 
 
In conclusion, two forms of competition can be seen emerging in the case study countries 
as a result of SAT-3/WASC.  In the ‘access market’, the research found some level of 
competition from VSAT operators.  However, where available, resellers of bandwidth would 
migrate to using fibre bandwidth rather than satellite.  The research also found evidence of 
competition in the ‘products market’, specifically in the form of VoIP and a buoyant ‘grey 
market’ in international services reported in all countries studied.   
 
5 Implications and recommendations 
This research set out to study the effect ownership of SAT-3/WASC has had on the 
communications market of four member countries, Angola, Cameroon, Ghana, and Senegal.  
The study was limited in scope to the areas that Open Access seeks to address - namely 
access and cost; with particular focus on the impact of SAT-3/WASC on the competitiveness 
of the markets for international and Internet services in each country.  The research found 
evidence of increased competition in these markets, and largely positive effects of the 
cable in terms of bandwidth capacity.  However, the research also found that the countries 
were not making the most of the potential of having access to high-speed, high-capacity 
bandwidth infrastructure. 
 
A key impediment to realising this potential is the ‘reinforced monopolies’ that are enjoyed 
by the SAT-3/WASC signatories.  This is illustrated in the diagram below (Figure 9), which 
represents the varying levels of monopolistic barriers that exist in most SAT-3/WASC 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and which by their very nature inhibit access.  The diagram 
portrays monopoly of the SAT-3/WASC landing station and international gateway licences, 
and the ownership of the national backhaul network as concentric circles around the SAT-
3/WASC cable. Those wishing to ‘access’ the bandwidth provided by the cable directly must 
navigate through these barriers.   
 
These circles are represented using solid and broken lines.  Solid lines represent pure 
monopolies. For example, at the time of this research, SAT-3/WASC was for the majority of 
countries the only submarine fibre-optic cable providing connectivity in sub-Saharan Africa.  
In such countries it is therefore a monopoly international fibre infrastructure.  It is also the 
case that in the majority (if not all) of the signatory countries, access to the SAT-3/WASC 
landing station is restricted to only the signatory operator.  The research did not find any 
evidence of co-location at the landing station in the countries studied. This constitutes 
another monopoly situation.   
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Figure 9: Concentric circles of monopolistic barriers 
 
Even though the ITU World Telecommunication Regulatory Database indicates that the 
market for international gateways in many sub-Saharan countries is open to full 
competition, this is rarely the case.  This research, and similar studies on international 
connectivity on the continent, shows that incumbent operators are often the legal sole 
providers of international connectivity in their countries – as exemplified by Senegal and 
Angola. But because ‘grey markets’ of international connectivity exist in these countries, 
the ‘international gateway’ circle is represented by a broken line.   
 
This is also the case for the ‘nation-wide backhaul’ network.  On the one hand, the lack of 
an extensive national backhaul severely limits the utilisation of the international cable and 
the ability of the various regions of the country, as well as neighbouring countries, to 
access its capacity equitably – Angola and Senegal provide two very different examples 
respectively.  Angola is still in the process of rebuilding its terrestrial network after years 
of civil war, while Senegal is supplying bandwidth to its neighbours.  On the other hand, 
sole ownership of the terrestrial network by the incumbent operator can lead to 
uncompetitive practices. A comprehensive terrestrial network is an expensive 
infrastructure to replicate. In the absence of strong regulation it can constitute a de-facto 
monopoly within an apparently liberalised market.  
 
The multiplicity of roles that the SAT-3/WASC signatory plays when it has sole ownership of 
the landing station, dominates the international gateway market (or is the legal sole 
provider of international connectivity in the country), and also owns the national terrestrial 
backhaul network, unsurprisingly results in severe conflicts of interests.  Examples of such 
conflicts were uncovered by this research with respect to competition.  Its findings show 
that competition is limited in the ‘access market’.  With monopoly over the undersea 
cable, landing station and international gateway, the SAT-3/WASC signatory dictates the 
bandwidth capacity of a country, the cost of bandwidth to other operators, and can also 
influence (by granting, denying or delaying access) the activities of operators in the market 
who are also often its competitors.  The SAT-3/WASC signatory was also found to influence 
competition in the ‘products market’.  This is because, as the market leader in 
international and Internet services, the signatory has a significant impact on the price of 
products in market.   
 
Any intervention by governments or relevant regulatory authorities in opening up access to 
SAT-3/WASC must be directed at the ‘concentric circles’ in the diagram, representing the 
signatory’s influence in the telecom markets of each of the countries. Such multi-
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dimensional measures must take all spheres of influence into consideration to be effective. 
For example, providing access to SAT-3/WASC landing stations without also addressing 
international gateway provision, and the state of equitable access to the terrestrial 
national backhaul network, is unlikely to have a significant impact on the way in which SAT-
3/WASC is utilised for the country’s benefit. 
 
With respect to the monopoly position of SAT-3/WASC in the sub-Saharan region, this report 
recommends measures that will ultimately result in the deployment of competing 
submarine infrastructure.  At least three new fibre optic submarine cables along the west 
coast of Africa are at different stages of completion and proposal.33  It is anticipated that 
competition, in the form of another cable, would promote a more market-oriented 
approach to SAT-3/WASC. 
 
With respect to SAT-3/WASC landing stations, this report echoes the call made by studies to 
promote competition by allowing other authorised operators (i.e. those that are able to 
carry international traffic into and out of the country) access to these facilities, and co-
locating their equipment at such sites. As discussed in section 3.1, the copy of the 1999 
SAT-3/WASC/SAFE Shareholders Agreement, that has been analysed by interest groups, 
states that capacity on the cable can only be sold via the consortium member in each 
country with a landing station.  Whether this is the case could not be ascertained by this 
research. However, opening up access to the landing stations would increase the ease with 
which other consortium members could sell their capacity directly to interested operators 
in member countries. Such a move is likely to facilitate business negotiations (and perhaps 
competition) between members, and also between interested non-member operators and 
the consortium. 
 
Although most SAT-3/WASC member countries legally permit competition in the 
international gateway market, liberalisation of this market segment has to be made a 
reality. In documenting the existence, and in some cases buoyancy, of ‘grey markets’ in the 
provision of international and Internet services, this research has highlighted the 
importance of VoIP in the countries studied.  This is an area where legality needs to be 
addressed by the regulatory authorities and governments so as to better capitalise on the 
potential it presents in increasing access to the population.   
 
This research also highlighted an increase in the deployment and adoption of wireless 
products and services.  In combination with an extensive deployment of national terrestrial 
backhaul networks from the landing points of SAT-3/WASC, wireless technologies – provided 
by a myriad of operators - are likely to play a key role in ‘last mile’ connectivity. 
Supporting wireless operators is key to realising the potential of SAT-3/WASC.   
 
In general, appropriate measures should be taken to create an environment in which new 
technologies can be adopted, and where service providers are able to obtain a fair price for 
bandwidth in order to satisfy the demands of their customers.  This report therefore calls 
for studies on the appropriate costing of SAT-3/WASC bandwidth in each member country 
and, based on this, the implementation of appropriate mechanisms to regulate prices. 
 
Lastly, with respect to nationwide terrestrial (fibre) backbone infrastructure, the research 
found that these were generally underdeveloped. Urban areas were significantly better 
connected than rural areas.  Weak terrestrial infrastructure was seen to have implications 
for the cost of access to backbone networks, particularly when multiple networks are 
required to achieve nationwide coverage. In response, this report calls for the prioritisation 
of terrestrial infrastructural development with national and rural access receiving as much 
attention as regional connectivity  (as the shown by the case of Burkina Faso, Mali, and 
Togo – see Section 4.4.1). 
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Notes 
 
1 The term “freedom” refers to the ability to live the life one values and has cause to 
value.  It takes into account the ability to attain basic needs and indicators of quality of 
life, as well as the resources and/or income that a person is able to command.  (Sen 1999) 
2 Competitiveness is defined as the possession of an advantage over other participants in a 
venture/field/area, that is able to improve the performance of the owner. 
3 See Krugman, Paul (1994) “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession” Foreign Affairs 73 
(2) pp. 28-44 for critique of this opinion. 
4 Yet according to a (2004) NEPAD report “… only 14 of 49 sub-Saharan countries have any 
fibre connection to each other or to the rest of the world” (cited at 
http://www.arp.harvard.edu/AfricaHigherEducation/Online.html). 
5 Technological innovations that have been of particular relevance include breakthroughs in 
the area of optical fibres, optical amplification and switching, wavelength-division 
multiplexing and photonics (Fong 2004). 
6 Shorb and Tourgee state that “A single modern submarine cable network is capable of 
transmitting up to 5.12 terabits, or the equivalent of 640 million voice calls 
simultaneously.” (2002:1) 
7 This centralised project management structure at times proved to be very efficient in 
planning and installing cable systems.  Fong (2004) provides the example of Global Crossing 
which was able to build a US$-1billion 21,000km cable system called Pacific Crossing-1 
within two years. 
8 See Lynch, Grahame (2005) “The new bandwidth barons: buying binge shifts global fibre 
assets from American to foreign ownership” America's Network,  
9  This refers to a business model in the telecommunications industry in which an operator 
sells or leases bandwidth on its infrastructure to other operators for reselling to their own 
customers. 
10 The diagram (Figure 3) only shows landing points on the African continent and therefore 
excludes Sesimbra, Portugal. 
11 Information about the cable is difficult to attain and verify as the agreement governing 
its development, operation and management is deemed “commercially confidential”.  The 
figures presented in this document are therefore subject to confirmation (but, where 
possible, information has been collated and corroborated from multiple sources). 
12 See Fibre for Africa story: “SAT3 Consortium Contract Emerges” for summary and analysis 
of this agreement.  Available online at http://fibreforafrica.net/main.shtml?x=5039398& 
als%5BMYALIAS6%5D=SAT3%20consortium%20contract%20emerges&als%5Bselect%5D=4887798 
13 France Telecom is reported to have invested US$96-million in SAT3/WASC/SAFE; 
incorporating the needs of subsidiaries: Sonatel in Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire Telecom and 
Mauritius Telecom.   
14 BalancingAct’s (2006) analysis of the 1999 shareholder’s agreement states that capacity 
was calculated in a distance-related measure; it therefore lays the basis for charging using 
“distance-related tariffs”. 
15 This refers to the savings operators that are members of the cable consortium enjoy by 
not routing their international traffic through US and European satellites (Dhliwayo 2005) 
16 The Purchasing Committee is “a sub-committee of MOU signatories that oversaw the 
building of the system and was given powers to run the capital project of building the 
system.” (BalancingAct 2006) 
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17 An ITWeb article, using the example of South Africa, provides evidence of how expensive 
charges can be for national backhaul transmission in comparison to internal connectivity: 
“On a two-year contract, a link between Johannesburg and London, which includes national 
backhaul access, costs R1.7-million, while the national backhaul from the landing station to 
Johannesburg costs R1.8-million.”  See Senne, D. (2007) “SAT3 hopes dashed” IT Web, 24 
May 2007.  Available online at www.itweb.co.za 
18 As defined in Spintrack AB. (2005) Open Access Models: Options for Improving the 
Backbone Access in Developing Countries (with a Focus on Sub-Saharan Africa).  World 
Bank, Information for Development Program (infoDev) 
19 See Eisenhardt, Katheleen M. (2002) “Building Theories from Case Study Research” in 
Huberman, Michael. and Miles, Matthew B. The Qualitative Researcher’s Companion.  Sage 
Publications Inc 
20 For reasons of confidentiality the names of interviewees have not been published in this 
document. 
21 Country case study reports will be made available on the APC webpage (www.apc.org).  
22 Angola Telecom operates as a fixed-line operator and ISP.  Angola Telecom also owns 
Angosat, which provides the national backbone with space rented from Intelsat; Movicel, 
which is a mobile operator using CDMA technology (and that also offers data services); and 
TV Cabo, which provides cable TV services and is also an ISP.  MS Telecom is a fixed-line 
operator and ISP and owns 25% share in Angola’s leading GSM operator, Unitel. 
23 In a press statement on October 30, 2007 the Ministry of Communications, Republic of 
Ghana announced that Celtel International, a subsidiary of Kuwaiti company Zain (formerly 
named MTC) had purchased 75% of the shares of Westel. The Government of Ghana, 
through the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, holds the remaining 25% 
(http://www.moc.gov.gh/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=235). 
24 “Ghana’s leading mobile operators in trouble.” afrol News, 16 October 2007 [online] 
http://www.afrol.com/articles/26945 Accessed 4 December 2007. 
25 However, as at the time of this research Cameroon Mobile Telecommunications 
Corporation was yet to launch its service. 
26 Capacity is allocated to the consortium members in MIU kilometres – MIU km, where MIU 
stands for Minimum Investment Units.  When a consortium member wants to implement a 
link to another member country, a defined number of MIU km are deducted from its 
balance.  Additional capacity can be obtained on demand by consortium members out of a 
pool of spare capacity from other members. 
27 To date only a small number of retail customers are buying SAT-3 bandwidth from 
Camtel, the first wholesale customers gained access to the facility only in 2005. 
28 These include MTN (GSM mobile operator), Orange (GSM mobile operator), Sonel (the 
national power utility), Pecten (a Cameroon-based oil company), Schlumberger (diversified 
technology company), and SITA (Societe Internationale de Telecommunications 
Aeronautiques) 
29 Synchronous Transport Module. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STM-1 
30 There is an inland fibre connection to the SAT-3 landing point in Ghana with three nodes 
in the greater Accra area: Cantonments Node has 63 E1s, Accra-North Node has 42 E1s and 
one 34 Mb/s tributary, and High Street (Cable Station) Node has 126 E1s. 
31 Note that Camtel's FCFA7-million for SAT3/WASC bandwidth compares favourably to VSAT 
prices, considering that it provides twice the downlink bandwidth and four times the uplink 
bandwidth, and is a better quality product with higher reliability and lower latency than 
satellite. 
32 Most customers are still subscribing to lower-cost services with more dial-up-like speeds 
of 64Kb/s or 128Kb/s, since current pricing of real broadband packages is out of reach for 
the majority of customers. 
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33 These include the submarine cable being laid by Nigeria’s second national operator 
Globacom (Glo-1); South Africa’s proposed Infraco cable; Maroc Telecom’s West Africa 
cable etc. 
